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FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINESTHE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE FOR
UPWARD DEPARTURE
Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Must a district court inform a defendant before imposing a
harsher sentence than that recommended by the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines? In Burns v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court held that a district court must provide reasonable notice of its
intention to depart upward from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
on a ground not articulated in the pre-sentence report or the government's pre-hearing submission. 2 The Court also held that a district court must specifically state the grounds on which it intends to
base its upward departure.3
This Note argues that Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's
majority opinion, incorrectly interpreted Rule 32 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure when he held that notice is required.
This Note contends that the Court's requirement of notice was judicial legislation, unauthorized by Congress and inconsistent with its
purpose in passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Further,
this Note argues, a requirement of notice is unnecessary because the
Guidelines themselves, by granting discretionary power of departure to a district court, notify defendants of the possibility of departure. This Note also reasons that the Court's decision violates
principles of judicial neutrality by forcing a district court to state a
preliminary position on the severity of a defendant's sentencing
before listening to all of the arguments at the sentencing hearing.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Court incorrectly raised the issue of constitutional due process because doing so is inconsistent
with precedent and does not adequately consider the protections
the existing system provides without a notice requirement.
I 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
2 Id. at 2187-88.
3 Id. at 2187.
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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

When United States District Judge Kimba M. Wood sentenced
Michael R. Milken for securities crimes, 4 she was not bound by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 5 After listening to counsel's arguments at the sentencing hearing and reading numerous letters both
praising and damning Milken, Judge Wood faced a difficult choice:
limited only by a statutory cap of twenty-eight years, what should
6
Milken's sentence be?
Judge Wood sentenced Milken to ten years in prison, followed
by three years of full-time community service. 7 In the comments she
made at sentencing, Judge Wood referred to several factors-the
importance of prison sentences as a deterrent in the financial community, misuse of Milken's position as a leader, Milken's community
service-but did not explain how she weighed these factors in making her sentencing determination. 8
Effective for crimes committed after November 1, 1987, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 9 eliminated the broad sentencing
discretion available to federal district court judges such as Judge
Wood.10 The Guidelines, baroque in their complexity, aim for consistency in sentencing by providing a limited range of sentences for
defendants convicted of similar offenses and with similar criminal
records."1 Consulting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the
specific offense under consideration and taking into account additional factors permitted by the Guidelines, a sentencing judge ar4 United States v. Milken, 3 Fed. Sent. R. 158.
5 Because Milken's crimes took place before the Guidelines were enacted, the

Guidelines did not apply to his sentencing.
6 Milken's guilty plea to six counts of criminal conduct generated the broad sentencing range. Milken at 158.
7 Id. at 162.
8 Id. at 161. One commentator could not discern Judge Wood's sentencing priorities, concluding "Indeed, the number ten itself remains a mystery." Stanton Wheeler,
Adversarial Biography: Reflections on the Sentencing of Michael Milken, 3 FED. SENT. R. 167,

169 (1990).
9 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

(1988).

10 THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a),

98 Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1986))
established the Federal Sentencing Commission and empowered it to promulgate the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were to take effect six months after the Commission submitted them. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (Supp. IV 1986). The Commission, an "independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a)
(Supp. III 1985), was held not to have violated the separation of powers principle in
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
11 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND

(b)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1985).

POLICY STATEMENTS

8

(1987); 28 U.S.C. § 991
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rives at a numerical Total Offense Level. After computing an
additional number-a Criminal History Category-the judge applies these numbers to a Sentencing Table, which generates a sentencing range in months. 12 If the judge finds that "there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the Guidelines" 1 3 the judge may depart from the
Guidelines 14 and must state the reasons for doing so in open
court. 15

III.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner William J. Burns worked for the United States
Agency for International Development (AID) from 1967 until
1988.16 While employed as a supervisor in AID's Financial Management Section, Burns authorized the payment of government funds
to "Vincent Kaufman," 17 including fifty-three government checks
12 For a straightforward discussion of problems applying the Guidelines, especially
the fact that judicial discretion still exists in making the numerical computations relating
to offender and offense, see Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 86 UCLA L. REv. 83, 99-103. The events in Milken illustrate that the
Guidelines themselves do not necessarily generate an unambiguous sentencing range.
While not bound by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Judge Wood requested computations from both parties of the Guidelines as they applied to Milken's crimes, and received two quite different sentencing ranges, purportedly generated by the same crimes
and past criminal history. While the government calculated a sentence of between fortysix and fifty-seven months, the defense figured Milken's appropriate sentence to be
twenty-one to twenty-seven months. Letter from Defense Attorney Arthur Liman to
Judge Kimba Wood, 3 Fed. Sent. R. 163 (1990).
After noting that the Sentencing Commission has created a software package to
arrive at the appropriate figures for sentence calculation, Weigel wryly observed that
"Presumably, the computers running this software will first obtain approval as constitutional due processors." Weigel, supra at 101.
13 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) (1991).
14 Such a sentence, based on a factor not considered by the Guidelines, the policy
statements, and the official commentary of the Sentencing Commission, must respect:
the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (2) (1991).
15 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (c) (1991).
16 United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17 Burns approved payments to "Kaufman" from a governmental travel fund for the
stated purpose that "Kaufman" had moved furniture for AID. No furniture was ever
moved, and the payments went into an account controlled by Burns. Brief for Respondent at 2, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991) (No. 89-7260) [hereinafter, Brief for Respondent].
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between 1982 and 1988 totaling over $1,200,000.18 AID officials
later discovered "Vincent Kaufman" was a fictitious name invented
by Bums, who kept the money for himself. 19 Government authorities arrested Burns after discovering that he had purchased a
$400,000 house on his yearly salary of $35,000.20
Burns pled guilty to: (1) theft of government funds in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 641;21 (2) making a false claim against the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287;22 and (3) evasion of income tax
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. 2 3 Burns pled guilty pursuant to an
agreement with the government which set forth a detailed plan for
his repayment of the government's money. 24 The plea agreement
also stated that both parties expected the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to apply and that Burns would be sentenced according to
an offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of I (re25
sulting in a sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months).
The probation officer's pre-sentence report agreed with the sen18

Id.

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Section 641 reads:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States
of any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use
or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted-Shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but
if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of$ 100, he shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1991).
22

Section 287 reads:

Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, millitary, or naval

service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim
upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing
such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than
five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title.
18 U.S.C. § 287 (1991).
23 Section 7201 reads:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more that $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation) or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1991).
24 United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The plea bargain obliged Burns to give up most of his personal assets, to surrender fifty percent of
his future annual income over $40,000 and one hundred percent of his future annual
income over $70,000, and to cooperate fully with the government's investigation. Id.
25 Id. at 1345.
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tencing range specified in the Guidelines. 2 6
At the sentencing hearing, Judge Norma Holloway Johnson of
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that the sentencing range specified by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would not suffice and sentenced Burns to a prison
term of sixty months. 2 7 Judge Johnson explained that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (b) permitted her departure from the suggested sentencing
range by allowing a sentencing judge to exercise discretion in sentencing when she finds that "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
Guidelines ....
judge Johnson also noted the Commission's
J28
comment that the "controlling decision as to whether and to what
extent departure is warranted can only be made by the court at the
time of sentencing.''29
Judge Johnson specified the three following factors which she
said that "the Guidelines either fail to address or to consider adequately": (1) the duration of Burns's criminal activity; (2) the disruption that his criminal activity caused to governmental functions;
and (3) Burns' concealment of his theft and false claims crimes
through tax evasion. 30 Judge Johnson took into account her "own
judgment and experience" and sentenced Burns to a term of sixty
31
months.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the validity of the district court's sentence. 3 2 In addition to
upholding Judge Johnson's three specific reasons for departing
from the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, the court of appeals
rejected Burns's contention that he should have had the opportunity
to comment on the district court's decision to depart upward from
the Guidelines. Burns argued that because Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32 (a) (1) obligates the court to give both sides notice of
a probation officer's recommendation of deviation from the GuideId.
Id. JudgeJohnson articulated her reasons for departing from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in a memorandum order filed on October 14, 1988, 1988 WL 113811
(D.D.C.).
28 1988 WL 113811 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) (1991)).
29 Id. (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION SENTENCING GUIDELINES sec.
5K2.0).
30 Id.
31 Id. In her memorandum order, Judge Johnson referred to Bums's "particularly
devious manner" of stealing over one million dollars of government funds over six
years. Id. She concluded that the Guidelines sentencing range "does not reflect the
magnitude of defendant's criminal conduct." Id.
32 United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
26
27
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lines and allows defense counsel an opportunity to comment on the
probation officer's recommendations at the sentencing hearing,
Rule 32 (a) (1) implicitly requires the trial judge to give the defendant proper notice of its intent to depart from the sentencing range
33
specified by the Guidelines.
The court of appeals dismissed Bums's argument that the trial
court should have given him notice of its intention to depart from
the Guidelines, stressing that such notice is not envisioned by Rule
32, and that "[s]uch a requirement would constitute a radical deviation from past practice and would impose a cumbersome burden on
trial judges." 34 The court of appeals added that the trial judge's
decision had not "harmed" Burns because Burns had the right to
address the court before sentencing and retained the right to appeal his sentence.3 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Circuits 3 6 over whether a district
33 Id at 1348. FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(a) (1) provides:
Sentence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay, but the court may, when
there is a factor important to the sentencing determination that is not then capable
of being resolved, postpone the imposition of sentence for a reasonable time until
the factor is capable of being resolved. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court
shall provide the counsel for the defendant and the attorney for the Government
with notice of the probation officer's determination, pursuant to the provisions of
subdivision (c) (2) (B), of the sentencing classifications and sentencing guideline
range believed to be applicable to the case. At the sentencing hearing, the court shall
afford the counselfar the defendant and the attorneyfor the Government an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relatingto the appropriate
sentence. Before imposing sentence, the court shall also(A) determine that the defendant and defendant's counsel have had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence investigation report made available pursuant to subdivision (c)(3) (A) or summary thereof made available pursuant to
subdivision (c) (3) (B);
(B) afford counsel for the defendant an opportunity to speak on behalf of the
defendant; and
(C) address the defendant personally and determine if the defendant wishes to
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence.
The attorney for the Government shall have an equivalent opportunity to speak
to the court. Upon a motion that is jointly filed by the defendant and by the attorney for the Government, the court may hear in camera such a statement by the
defendant, or the attorney for the Government.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(a) (1) (1989) (emphasis added).
34 Burns, 893 F.2d at 1348.

35 Id.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 56 (2nd Cir. 1989) (the court of
appeals reasoned that the rationale behind requiring notice of the contents of the
presentence report, 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (d) (Supp. V 1987)-to "ensure accuracy of sentencing information," Advisory Committee Notes of the 1983 Amendment to Rule 32
(c) (3)(A), (B), & (C)-should also apply to notice of grounds of upward departure, suggesting that district court's comment at a sidebar that it intended not to depart may have
led to a "false sense of security" which could have deprived defense counsel of an oportunity to comment on a departure); United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1415
(9th Cir. 1989) (District court's failure to provide notice of upward departure violated an
implied notice requirement of FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (d) by
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court can depart upward from the range specified by the Federal
37
Sentencing Guidelines without informing the parties.
IV.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the majority, 38 Justice Marshall reversed the holding of the court of appeals and held that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32 obligates a district court to give the parties reasonable
notice that it is contemplating upward departure 3 9 from the Guide40
lines and to identify the grounds for such departure.
Justice Marshall first discussed the procedural reforms implemented by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Sentencing Reform Act, he explained, was enacted, inter alia, to promote
uniformity in sentencing and to minimize the previously broad discretionary power of individual judges. 4 1 He said Rule 32 "[provided] for focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal
issues relevant to determining the appropriate Guidelines sentence." 4 2 In support of this conclusion, he stated that Rule 32 (c)
(3) (A) requires the probation officer to provide the pre-sentence
report to both parties at least ten days before the sentencing, and
that in the spirit of the adversarial tradition, parties may file objections to the report.4 3 Additionally, Rule 32 (a) (1) specifies that "at
the sentencing hearing, the court [must] afford the counsel for the
defendant and the attorney for the government an opportunity to
comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other
44
matters relating to the appropriate sentence."
Justice Marshall considered the case at bar unusual. Whereas a
failing to allow the defendant an opportunity to comment even though the facts of the
presentence report in the instant case suggested departure); United States v. Otero, 868
F.2d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1989)(FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 requires notice of upward depar-

ture because notice furthers Rule 32's purpose of ensuring accuracy in sentencing information by allowing defendant to comment on grounds for upward departure at the
sentencing hearing).
37 Bums v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990).
38 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Marshall's majority

opinion.
39 Although the Court limited its decision to a judge's upward departures from the
sentencing guidelines, petitioner noted that the logic of his argument should require
notice of a downward departure as well. Brief for Petitioner at p. 17, n.8, Bums v. United

States., 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991) (No. 89-7260).
40 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2184.
41 Id. at 2184-2185.
42 Id. at 2187.

43 Id. at 2186.
44 Id. at 2186 (quoting FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(a) (1)).
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defendant normally is put on notice of the possibility of an upward
departure by the government's recommendation or the pre-sentence report, in the present case, neither the government nor the
probation officer suggested that an upward departure would be appropriate. Due to the district judge's sua sponte sentencing decision,
neither side expected an upward adjustment in the sentence. 45
The Court supported its reading of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32 by viewing any other reading as contrary to Congress'
intentions. Justice Marshall conceded that Congress had failed to
comment on a circuit court's duty to give notice of its intent to depart from the Guidelines, but stated that any inference the Court
could draw from such silence "certainly cannot be credited when it
is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent."'4 6 Justice Marshall insisted that a reading not requiring a district court to give notice of its intent to depart from the
Guidelines, "renders meaningless the parties' express right 'to
comment upon.

.

.

matters relating to the appropriate sentence.

The right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed' that a decision is contemplated.- 47 In essence, Justice Marshall alleged that the contrary reading of Rule 32 is nonsensical
because it would allow a defendant to comment on his sentence at
the sentencing hearing without knowing that the court was contemplating a departure upward from the Guidelines.
Justice Marshall continued his assault on the contrary reading
of Rule 32 by envisioning two possible extreme outcomes if the government's reading of Rule 32 were adopted. While in one situation
a desperate defendant may randomly and inefficiently attempt to anticipate ajudge's possible reasons for a sua sponte departure from the
Guidelines at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, in another
situation an otherwise zealous defense counsel may consider not
raising the possibility of such a departure, not wanting to seem to
concede the seriousness of a client's offense. 48 When parties fail to
anticipate a circuit court's "unannounced and uninvited" departure
from the Guidelines, Justice Marshall argued, "a critical sentencing
determination will go untested by the adversarial process contemId. at 2185.
Id. at 2186.
47 Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)) (balancing the individual interest protected by the Fourteeth Amendment-the
"right to be heard"-against the interests of the State to determine whether statutory
notice of publication meets the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
48 Id.
45
46
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plated by Rule 32 and the Guidelines." 4 9
The Court further found its decision justified by precedent. According to Justice Marshall, in cases analogous to the instant case,
the Supreme Court had previously construed statutes involving
deprivation of liberty as requiring both notice and an opportunity
for response.5 0 Additionally, when confronted with a choice between two seemingly acceptable alternatives, the Court has repeatedly construed statutes in favor of the interpretation that does not
raise a constitutional problem. 5 1 Justice Marshall suggested that not
obliging the circuit court to provide notice in the present case would
raise a due process problem, and stated that obliging the court to do
52
so would avoid the issue altogether.
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Writing the dissent 53 , Justice Souter characterized the majority
decision as judicial legislation with no basis in either the Sentencing
Reform Act or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 54 Justice
Souter stated that the Sentencing Reform Act is procedurally complicated and comprehensive. 5 5 Against this backdrop of numerous
procedural requirements, Justice Souter concluded that congressional silence on the issue of notice meant that Congress intended
49 Id.

50 Id. at 2187. The Court cited the following cases to support a statutory construction in favor of notice when issues of deprivation of liberty or property are involved:
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107-108 (1946) (statute permitting
Securities and Exchange Commission to order corporate dissolution); TheJapanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 99-101(1903) (statute permitting exclusion of aliens seeking
to enter United States). Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187. The Court also cited cases in which
statutes were interpreted to assure "procedural fairness": Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (right to full, adversary-style representation in juvenile transfer
proceedings); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 495-508 (1959) (right to confront adverse witnesses and evidence in security-clearance revocation proceedings); Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51(1950) (right to formal hearing in deportation proceedings). Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187.
51 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187 (referring to EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").
52 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187.
53 Part I ofJustice Souter's opinion addressed whether the terms of the Sentencing
Reform Act or Supreme Court precedent compel notice of a judge's sua sponte decision
to depart upwards from the Guidelines; Part II addressed whether lack of notice raises
constitutional issues. Justices White and O'Connor joined both parts ofJustice Souter's
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Part 1 ofJustice Souter's opinion.
Id. (Souter, J. dissenting).
54 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 2188 (Souter,J., dissenting).
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not to require it: "the terms of the Act reflect a decided congressional disinclination to rely on presuppositions and silent intentions
56
in place of explicit notice requirements.Justice Souter disagreed with the majority over the meaning of
a provision of Rule 32 (a) (1) which required that the parties be
given "an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence. ' 57 The Court stated that a party could only meaningfully
comment on such matters when they have been enumerated explicitly by the circuit judge. 5 8 But Justice Souter pointed out a logical
inconsistency with this position. While the majority would infer a
requirement of notice from the proposition that a defendant should
be able to comment on matters related to sentencing, the Guidelines explicitly provide for notice to both parties by requiring the
court to provide both parties with the results of the probation officer's pre-sentence report. 59 Rule 32 also provides that defendant
and defendant's counsel "have had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence investigation report." 60 These explicit provisions, argued Justice Souter, would be redundant under the
majority reading, but Congress included them explicitly. 61 . Congress could have allowed all notice provisions to have been implied.
62
However, it chose to enumerate some but not others.
"

Justice Souter then attacked the Court's assertion that not requiring notice would be "absurd" because that interpretation would
"render meaningless" the defendant's express right to comment on
"other matters relating to the appropriate sentence." 6 3 Justice Souter made two criticisms of the majority's statement: (1) the defendant would only lose his ability to comment on one matter-the
contemplation of the circuit court to depart from the GuidelinesId. at 2189 (Souter,J., dissenting).
Id. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting). See, supra, note 33 for the full text of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(a) (1).
58 Burns, 11l S. Ct. at 2186.
59 Id. at 2189 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c)(3)(A), (C)).
The pre-sentence report includes the probation officer's determination of the appropriate sentencing categories pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a) and an explanation of why a
deviation from the Guidelines may be appropriate. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(B) (1991).
60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(A).
61 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62 Justice Souter stated: "when Congress meant to provide notice and disclosure, it
was careful to be explicit, as against which its silence on the predeparture notice at issue
here bespeaks no intent that notice be given." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 for the assertion that not requiring notice renders meaningless the defendant's right to comment on
other matters.
56
57
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leaving him free to comment on any other matter relating to his sentence that he wished; 64 and (2) the statute itself explicitly indicates
the power of the circuit court to depart from the Guidelines under
"an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described," 65 leaving the parties to address that
possibility at the sentencing hearing as they wish. 6 6 Justice Souter
pointedly added that "it is not our practice to supplement [congressional] provisions simply because we think that some statutory provision might usefully do further duty than Congress has assigned to
it."
Justice Souter then addressed the issue of constitutional due
process raised by Justice Marshall. He noted that a prisoner had a
constitutionally protected interest in his expectancy that a parole
board should order his release unless certain statutory criteria are
fulfilled. 6 7 In the instant situation, he concluded that the nature of
the defendant's constitutionally protected interest is his expectation
that he will receive a sentence within the range provided by the
Guidelines unless "aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a
kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission" 68 exist and justify departure from the
69
Guidelines.
Justice Souter applied the three-part test articulated in Mathews
v. Eldridge70 to determine whether possible governmental error
would infringe this constitutionally protected interest. 71 The three
parts of the inquiry in Mathews include:
Id- at 2190 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id at 2186 (SouterJ., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that Bums' Counsel in the case at
bar had in fact addressed the possibility of the court's departing upward from the Guidelines, even though the court had not suggested that it had contemplated doing so. At
the sentencing hearing, petitioner's counsel asked: "that the period of incarceration be
limited enough that [petitioner] has a family to return to, that he has a future that he can
work towards rebuilding, and we think the guidelines are the appropriate range, Your
Honor. We ask Your Honor to consider a sentence within the guidelines." Id. at 2191.
67 Id. at 2191-2192 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1(1979)). See infra text accompanying notes 134-141 for a discussion
of Greenholtz.
68 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(1991).
69 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2191-92.
70 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
71 While Mathews took place in an administrative context, Justice Souter concluded
that the three-part inquiry has been applied generally to evaluate whether procedures
meet due process requirements. Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)).
64
65
66
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that72the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
After working through the three Mathews factors, Justice Souter con-

cluded that the existing system, without a notice requirement, pro-

7
vided sufficient due process protection. "

While acknowledging the defendant has a significant interest in
receiving a sentence that is not unlawfully excessive, Justice Souter
stressed the additional "drain on judicial resources" that a requirement of notice would add to the sentencing process. 74 He men-

tioned that a recent survey of federal judges confirmed that they
believed that the Guidelines, even without a notice requirement,
have made sentencing more time-consuming. 75 The competing in-

terests of the defendant and the government in the first Mathews
consideration, Justice Souter concluded, were "substantial and contrary" and therefore he could not not easily identify either one as

76
more important than the other.
In addressing the second Mathews consideration, Justice Souter

emphasized that existing procedures provided for the risk of both
factual and legal errors that could cause a sentencing judge to depart from the sentencing Guidelines improperly. 77 Justice Souter

stated that errors of fact may be found in the pre-sentence report
and challenged before the sentencing hearing subject to the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) (3) (A). 7 8 Justice
72 Id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
73 Id. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting).
74 Id at 2193 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter distinguished between two timings of notice to the defendant: before the sentencing hearing and at the hearing itself.

Notice before the hearing, Justice Souter alleged, is likely to postpone sentencing, adding more time to an already lengthy process. Id. Contemporaneous notice at the hearing might prompt defense counsel to argue more emphatically, but "it would not be of
much help in enabling him to present evidence on disputed facts he had not previously
meant to contest, or in preparing him to address the legal issue of the adequacy of the
Guidelines in reflecting a particular aggravating circumstance."Id., supra note 4.
75 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2192 (citing REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 137 (1990))(Indicating that ninety percent of federal judges polled report that the
Guidelines have increased the time they have spent on sentencing; thirty percent of the
judges state that the Guidelines have increased the time they have spent on sentencing
by fifty percent).
76 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2193-2194 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2194 (Souter,J., dissenting). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (3) (A) provides that:
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Souter added that a judge's departure upward from the Guidelines
is a matter of law without the need for fresh evidentiary proof, and is
79
therefore subject to meaningful appellate review.
Finally, Justice Souter discussed the due process implications of
allowingjudges to determine that a given defendant deserves a sentence above the range dictated by the guidelines. 80 In doing so, he
considered the remedies available when a sentencing judge unreasonably imposes a sentence above the range specified by the Guidelines. 81 The nature of sentencing, Justice Souter explained, is
imprecise, and a range of sentences exist that a judge may reasonably consider appropriate for a particular defendant. 82 The Sentencing Reform Act provides two remedies to ensure that the judge's
83
sentencing decision "falls within this zone of reasonableness."
First, a defendant has the opportunity to address the court at
the sentencing hearing. Because the terms of the Act provide for
departure from the Guidelines when the court finds that "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating its Guidelines," 84 a defendant may
choose to address that possibility specifically at the sentencing hearAt a reasonable time before imposing sentence the court shall permit the defendant
and his counsel to read the report of the presentence investigation exclusive of any
recommendation as to sentence, but not to the extent that in the opinion of the
court the report contains diagnostic opinions which, if disclosed, might seriously
disrupt a program of rehabilitation; or sources of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality; or any other information which, if disclosed, might result
in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. The court shall
afford the defendant and his counsel an opportunity to comment on the report and, in the discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual
inaccuracy contained in it.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (3) (A) (emphasis added).
79 Burns, 1 I1 S. Ct. at 2194 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter contended that
whether an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists to justify a departure from the
Guidelines is a matter of law because it involves a determination of the intentions of the
Federal Sentencing Commission when it passed the SFNTENCING REFORM ACT of 1984.
Id.
Justice Souter conceded that defendants whose terms are specified by the Guidelines to be less than the time it takes to process an appeal find themselves in a position
where an appeal cannot entirely right the wrong caused by an erroneous decision to
depart upward from the Guidelines. Id., n.7. But he dismissed this potentially vulnerable class of defendants by reasoning that "a process must be judged by the generality of
cases to which it applies, and therefore a process which is sufficient for the large majority
of a group of claims is by constitutional definition sufficient for all of them." Id., n.7
(quoting Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985)).
80 Id. at 2195. (Souter, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 2195 (Souter,J., dissenting).
82 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
84 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) (1982).
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ing.8 5 If a defendant chooses not to address explicitly the possibility
of a departure from the Guidelines, Justice Souter noted that "pleas
for leniency within the Guidelines often duplicate the arguments
86
that can be made against upward departure."
In addition to arguments at the sentencing hearing, Justice Souter again stressed the possibility of appellate review of the sentence.8 7 Because of the availability of appellate review for an
unreasonable departure from the Guidelines, a defendant does not
face the risk of serving an unreasonably long sentence and thus due
process does not require notice.8 8 Rather, a defendant faces the risk
of not being able to craft a specific argument to address the stated
possibility of an upward departure or not being able to address with
the benefit of notice where a judge should sentence the particular
defendant within the "zone of reasonableness" permitted by the
Guidelines.8 9
V.

ANALYSIS

In Burns, the Supreme Court improperly required sentencing
judges to provide notice of their intention to depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and to provide notice of their anticipated grounds for departure. With no authority from Congress, the
Court added a burdensome procedural requirement that contradicts
precedent and does not conform with Congress' intentions.
A.

THE COURT ENGAGED IN JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

The Court improperly assumed legislative authority in Burns, by
essentially amending The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 without
an opportunity for congressional debate and without allowing Congress-representing the people-to vote on the change. The Court
purported to read Congress' mind in Burns. From statutory and legislative silence, the Court created a new requirement for sentencing
judges: to exercise their statutory right to depart upwards from the
Sentencing Guidelines when they find "that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
85 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2195 (Souter, J., dissenting). At the sentencing hearing,
Bums's counsel actually addressed the possibility of an upward departure. See supra note
66.
86 Burns, Ill S. Ct. at 2195 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). But see, supra note 79 for the exception to this statement.
89 Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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guidelines," sentencing judges must now give "reasonable notice" 90
that they are considering departure and list their grounds for doing
SO.91

Justice Marshall began his analysis by discussing the fact that
Congress did not address the issue of requiring notice. First, he
belittled the government's attempt to derive "decisive meaning
from congressional silence." 92 The government noted, said Justice
Marshall, that Rule 32(c) (3) (A) expressly requires the district court
to give both parties 10 days notice of the contents of the pre-sentence report. 9 3 The government concluded from this provision for
explicit notice that the absence of other explicit requirements of notice meant that Congress did not intend to require notice in the
94
present case.
Justice Marshall took issue with the government's conclusion,
arguing that in the absence of explicit provision, notice should be
compelled by "the textual and contextual evidence of legislative intent." 9 5 Justice Marshall explained that in some situations, "Congress' silence signifies merely an expectation that nothing more
need be said in order to effectuate the relevant legislative objective." 96 He stated that an inference drawn from congressional silence would not be allowed if "contrary to all other textual and
contextual evidence of congressional intent." 97 Justice Marshall
concluded that not requiring notice contradicts Congressional
intent 98
After deriding the government for deriving " decisive meaning
90 Id- at 2187.

Id.
Id.
93 Id. at 2186. FED. R. CGRIM. P. 32 provides that:
At least ten days before imposing sentence, unless this minimum period is
waived by the defendant, the court shall provide the defendant and the defendant's
counsel with a copy of the report of the presentence investigation including the
information required by subdivision (c) (2) and not including any final recommendation as to sentence, but not to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report
contains diagnostic opinions which, if disclosed, might seriously disrupt a program
of rehabilitation; or sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or
otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. The court shall afford the defendant
and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment on the report and, in the
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating to any
alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 32 (c) (3) (A).
94 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2186.
91
92

95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
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from congressional silence," 9 9 Justice Marshall did the same thing
himself. While acknowledging that Congress had not decided the
issue, he created a rule that he believed to be consistent with congressional intent. But any direction given by congressional intentin the text of the legislation and the legislative history-is far from
clear. 100 In the absence of a clear legislative mandate, Justice Marshall incorrectly introduced the additional requirement of notice
into the already complex Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Did Congress intend the revolutionary Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 to be a bare, unfinished procedural skeleton which appellate
courts may flesh out on an ad hoc basis? The Act's substantive and
procedural complexities indicate that Congress intended to enact
comprehensive sentencing legislation, with few broad provisions
subject to interpretation by the judiciary. Indeed, Congress itself
has amended the Sentencing Reform Act several times' 0 1 adding
even more substantive procedure and detail, suggesting that Congress intended additional procedural requirements to be its own
province or that of its creation, the Federal Sentencing Commission,
not that of the judiciary.
Justice Marshall asserted that "textual and contextual evidence
of legislative intent" suggest a requirement of notice. 10 2 That evidence apparently lies in the text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which was amended by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.103 Interpreting Rule 32, Justice Marshall said that not requiring notice "renders meaningless the parties' express right [found in
Rule 32(a)(1)] 'to comment on... matters relating to the appropriate sentence.' -104 He further concluded that "the government's
construction of congressional 'silence' would ... render what Con10 5
gress has expressly said absurd."'
Justice Marshall's reasoning is not convincing. Congress chose
to give a convicted criminal the right to "comment" on "matters
relating to the appropriate sentence." 1 0 6 Despite Justice Marshall's
99 Burns, Ill S. Ct. at 2186.
100 Only a slim majority agreed with Justice Marshall. See supra note 38.
101 18 U.S.C. § 3553's amendments include: Pub. L. 99-570, Title I, § 1007(a), Oct.

27, 1968, 100 Stat, 3207-7; Pub. L. 99-646, §§ 8(a), 9(a), 80(a), 81(a), Nov. 10, 1986,
100 Stat. 3593, 3619; Pub. L. 100-182, §§ 3, 16(a), 17, Dec. 7, 1987, 101 Stat. 1266,
1269, 1270; Pub. L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7102, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4416).
102 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2186.
103 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (1984).
104 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2186 (emphasis added).
105 Id. (emphasis added).
106 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). See supra note 33 for full text of FED. R. CRI. P.
32(a)(1).
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efforts to prove the contrary, "comment" means "comment," not
the right to be informed on every conceivable matter relating to the
sentence.' 0 7 The "comment" and "matters relating to the appropriate sentence" language was included to make it clear that the defendant's right to comment extended beyond the traditional right to
allocution-a general plea for mercy.' 0 8 Instead, the statutory language clearly does not restrict a defendant to the matters contained
in the pre-sentence report; he may comment on any matter he
wishes. 10 9 There is no evidence that Congress intended this right to
"comment" to include judicial contemplation of departure. As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, a defendant lacking judicial
notice of possible upward departure may comment on any matter
she wishes, including the possibility of upward departure."l 0 Justice
Marshall's conclusion rings particularly false considering that petitioner's counsel commented at the sentencing hearing, ". . .we think
the guidelines are the appropriate range, Your Honor. We ask Your
Honor to consider a sentence within the guidelines."" I
Justice Marshall did not recognize that Congress may have had
good reason to provide for notice of the contents of the pre-sentence report 1 2 and not to provide notice of a trial judge's decision
to depart upwards from the Guidelines. 1 3 Notice of the contents of
the pre-sentence report is necessary to provide the parties an opportunity to comment on the factual basis for the sentencing. Notice of a decision to depart upwards from the Guidelines, on the
other hand, presents a far less compelling benefit: it gives defendants the benefit of ajudge's tentative legal opinion, which if erroneous may be reversed on appeal. In addition, though, such a
requirement of notice interferes with important principles ofjudicial
impartiality 1 4 and adds an additional administrative burden to already overburdened trial judges. Any proposition on which the Act
is silent, Justice Marshall appeared to say, may be justified if it is
consistent with the Court's interpretation of congressional intent.
This disturbing idea is a mandate for judicial legislation.
During the Senate debates on departure from the Guidelines,
the Senators did not explicitly discuss a notice requirement for a
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 24 n.9.
Id. (citing Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion))
(Describing common-law right of allocution).
107
108

109 Id.
110

Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2190-91 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).

111 Id. at 2191.

R. GRIM. P. 32 (c)(3)(A).
Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 2186-7.
See infra text accompanying notes 130-133.

112 FED.
113
114
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sentencing departure.' 15 Senator Hart, who proposed the amend16
ment specifying under what circumstances a judge may depart,
described the amendment:
[T]he amendment adding the "aggravating or mitigating circumstances" language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)] says that ajudge shall sentence a convicted offender within the guidelines established by the
sentencing commission unless there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances of an extraordinary nature; then, that he must report what those
circumstances are in
deviatingfrom the guidelines laid down by the sentenc1 17
ing commission.
Senator Hart's language here may be helpful in figuring out whether
notice is consistent with Congress' intentions. 1 18 When Senator
Hart said that ajudge must specify grounds for departure "in deviating from the guidelines," ' 1 9 it seems clear that he meant that the
grounds must be stated at the same time that sentencing is imposed,
not stated in advance of sentencing, as Burns now requires. 120 Senator Hart's second summary of the purpose of the amendment, which
notes that a judge "must state what those circumstances are in rendering his sentence outside the guidelines,"' 12 1 also clearly indicates
that the amendment's author meant that announcement of the
grounds for upward departure should be made contemporaneously
with the actual sentencing and not before.
Justice Marshall's undocumented assertion that not requiring
notice is "contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of
legislative intent"' 12 2 is therefore not persuasive. A statement by an
amendment's proposer during Senate debates is certainly "contextual evidence of legislative intent."' 123 Senator Hart's uncontra115 See 124 CONG. REC. 382-83 (1973).
116 The amendment reads, in pertinent part:
The court shall impose a sentence within the range described in subsection (a)(4)
unless the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists that was
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a different sentence.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) (1982).
117 124 CONG. REC. 383 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Hart) (emphasis added).
118 That Senator Hart echoed this language when he reiterated the purpose of the
amendment is further reason that his words should be taken seriously:
All this amendment does is to state a sentence the judge must operate within the
framework of the guidelines unless there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Then he must state what those circumstances are in rendering his sentence outside the
guidelines.

124

CONG. REC.

383 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Hart) (emphasis added).

119 Id.
120 Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2184 (1991).
121 124 CONG. REC. 383 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Hart) (emphasis added).
122 Burns, Ill S. Ct. at 2186.
123 Id.
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dicted, repeated statements of his amendment's purpose 124
demonstrate that it is the Court's judicially-created requirement of
notice that seems to contradict legislative intent.
The Court's judicial legislation is further unwarranted because
it is unnecessary, not just because it is inconsistent with Congress'
intentions and an improper usurpation of legislative authority. The
Court's requirement of notice is redundant because all defendants
who are sentenced according to the terms of the Guidelines are already put on notice by the Guidelines themselves that departure is a
possibility. Because the Federal Sentencing Act is a public record,
and because the Act specifically grants a sentencing judge the discretion to depart when she finds that "there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. .. 125, defendants and their counsel are simply
already on notice that departure might occur without the needless
requirement of notice provided by Burns.
Congress could have chosen to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a notice requirement, but it did not do so. In Burns the
Court improperly assumed Congress' role by creating a new procedural requirement-the requirement of notice-which a judge must
now meet in order to exercise her explicitly granted discretion to
depart upward from the Guidelines.
B.

THE BURNS COURT'S NOTICE REQUIREMENT ERODED THE
APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY

The result reached by the Court clashes with fundamental principles of judicial neutrality. To compel a sentencing judge to announce that she is considering the possibility of upward departure
from the Guidelines either before or during the sentencing hearing
requires the judge to state a position, however tentative, before the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing. Such a requirement suggests
that a sentencing judge has formed a preliminary idea about the severity of the sentence she will grant before listening to the complete
sentencing hearing. This pre-judgment subverts the appearance of
judicial neutrality, whether or not the judge in fact departs from the
Guidelines.
The Court's requirement of notice actually forces judges to
make potentially premature statements about their sentencing inclinations before the conclusion of the sentencing hearing; if judges
124 124 CONG. REC. 383 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Hart).
125 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
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do not make that determination and announce that they are considering departure from the Guidelines, they now eliminate the option
of departure that Congress specifically authorized in the Federal
Sentencing Act. After Burns, a judge may not wait until the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, ponder her decision, and exercise
her discretionary power to depart from the Guidelines. Such a perverse result may well force judges to announce at every sentencing
hearing their contemplation of departure from the Guidelines in order to preserve their right to do so. If that altogether possible scenario were to come about, such a pro forma announcement of
contemplation of departure would become a meaningless ritual with
very little conceivable benefit to the litigants.
Additionally, a judge who is forced by Burns to make a preliminary announcement that she is contemplating departure from the
Guidelines may become less receptive to mitigating evidence at the
sentencing hearing. If a sentencing judge only rarely makes an announcement that she is considering departure, several factors suggest that it will be difficult for her to change her mind later, even
after defense counsel has had the opportunity to make a specific
plea against departure from the Guidelines. Before the sentencing
hearing begins, the judge knows of the contents of the pre-sentence
report which provide the factual basis for sentencing and thus will
not be confronted with any additional facts to consider about the
defendant and the offense. Any change in the judge's position during the sentencing hearing will result from arguments made by defense counsel, not by any change in the defendant's factual
situation. In addition to the difficulty of changing her mind about
departing from the Guidelines with no further factual information to
persuade her that such a departure is unwarranted, the judge may
face psychological difficulty in retreating from her initial statement
and openly admitting that she had made a mistake.
Knowing the judge has announced that she is considering upward departure, a defendant may consider the sentencing hearing to
be a futile exercise in front of a partisan judge. Granted, the defendant learns the "ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure"' 26 when the court provides notice.
But far from furthering the admirable goal of adversarial development of the court's stated preliminary reason for departure, as
urged by Justice Marshall, 127 stating reasons for departure prematurely will likely cause a defendant to believe the court has taken
126 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187.
127 Id. at 2186-87.
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sides. This perceived unfairness may lead to unwanted appeals.1 28
The government, knowing the court has made an announcement contemplating departure, has information that may substantively affect its sentencing request, or at least the tenor of its
argument at the sentencing hearing. For example, in the instant
case, the government did not request a sentence exceeding the
Guidelines. But if the court had stated that it was considering a departure, surely the government would have revised its sentencing
request upward, based only on judicial notice, not on any substantive difference in the factual or legal circumstances surrounding the
crime.1 2 9 From the defendant's point of view, this perceived encouragement of the prosecution may provoke prosecutorial rhetoric
that could neutralize whatever pleas for leniency defense counsel
may make that knowledge of a judge's intent to depart may have
permitted.
C.

LACK OF NOTICE DOES NOT PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

The Court's cursory constitutional analysis misapplies a canon
of statutory interpretation, ignores relevant precedent, and fails to
consider the present system's protection of a defendant's due process interest. The Court raised the specter of due process and
stated the Court's preference for construing statutes to prevent "serious constitutional problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress." 1 30 The majority opinion tersely
concluded that because Rule 32 does not specifically permit departure without notice the Court must choose the statutory construction-requirement of notice-that seems to present no
13
constitutional problems. '
The majority raises the issue of due process to suggest a choice
between competing acceptable constructions of Rule 32: to require
notice or not to require notice. But Justice Marshall presents a misleading framework. Justice Marshall would offer a choice between
(1) a "construction" of Rule 32 (requiring notice) that creates a procedural requirement not found in the text and arguably inconsistent
with the text and with congressional intent 32 and (2) a construction
128 See infra text accompanying notes 146-155.
129 This scenario puts aside the terms of the plea bargain agreement in this case. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-26, regarding the Government's statement that it expected the sentencing guidelines to apply.
130 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187 (quoting EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
131 Id.

132 See supra text accompanying notes 106-124.
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not requiring notice that is clearly consistent with the fact that Congress did not address the issue of notice directly. As Justice Souter
pointed out in his dissent, the majority's "construction" of Rule 32
"comes closer to reconstruction than construction."'' 33
Justice Marshall failed to demonstrate how the absence of a notice requirement presents due process problems. He merely asserted that it did so without reference to case law or treatises.
Justice Marshall made no attempt to distinguish the instant case
from Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and CorrectionalCom35
plex 134 which the United States discussed in its Brief to the Court.1
Reversing a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Eighth Circuit 36 , the Court in Greenholtz rejected a requirement that
a parole board provide "written notice of the precise time of the
[parole] hearing reasonably in advance of the hearing, settingforth the
13 7
factors which may be considered by the Board in reaching its decision."'
The Court held that due process did not require notice of factors
considered by the Board and that informing the inmate of the time
of the parole hearing without posting notice of the factors considered by the Board satisfied the requirements of due process.138 The
Court referred to previous practice in making its determination that
notice was not required, stating that Nebraska's parole statute resembled a "sentencing judge's choice... to grant or deny probation
following a judgment of guilt, a choice never thought to require
more than what Nebraska now provides for the parole-release determinations."' 13 9 While Greenholtz was a pre-Federal Sentencing
Guidelines case, dealing with whether a parole board should provide notice to an inmate, as Justice Souter noted, the inmate's interest in early parole resembles a criminal defendant's interest in a
shorter sentence. 140 Justice Marshall should have explained how he
would have reconciled the fact that due process did not require notice in Greenholtz with his suggestion that due process would require
41
notice in the case at bar.1
Justice Marshall did not perform the due process balancing-ofinterests test articulated in Mathews 142 thatJustice Souter performed
133 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
134 442 U.S. 1 (1979).

135 Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at pp. 11-12.
136 576 F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1978).
137 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 14, n.6.
139 Id. at 16.
140 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 2187.
142 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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in his dissent. 143 He did not articulate the nature of the petitioner's
interest that might be subject to due process protection. As such, he
did not consider the remedies that existed for the petitioner without
requiring notice. In addition to remedies of addressing the court at
the sentencing hearing and meaningful appellate review, the terms
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 themselves put the petitioner
on notice that departure was possible even without the requirement
14 4
created by the Court in Burns.
Justice Marshall's argument that principles of statutory interpretation suggest a notice requirement1 4 5 depends on his erroneous
assumption that not requiring notice would pose serious constitutional problems. Particularly troubling is Justice Marshall's failure
to attempt to explain what petitioner's protected interest is, and
whym-seemingly contrary to relevant precedent and without going
through the Mathews balancing test-due process would require notice in the instant case.
VI.

BURNS IN PRACTICE: APPEARANCE OF PARTISANSHIP DURING
THE SENTENCING HEARINGS AND A WASTEFUL APPEAL?

As of the time of this writing, one appellate decision, United
States v. Padron146, has followed Burns. In accordance with the holding in Burns, 14 7 the district court judge in Padron informed the defense counsel during trial that he had intended to increase the
defendant's applicable sentencing guideline range by two points if
the defendant testified and was found guilty.1 48 At trial the court
considered such testimony an "aggravating circumstance," ' 14 9 and
explained to defense counsel:
I am not at all trying to chill your interest in presenting a defense. I
simply think that in fairness, since the appellate courts seem to think
we should advise people in advance when we're going to go above the
143 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at

2192-96.

144 18 U.S.C. § 3553 explicitly provides that a sentencing judge may depart from the
Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
145 Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2187.
146 938 F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 199 1) (After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin. Defendant's petition, due to the
district court's warning at trial that the court would depart from the Guidelines if defendant testified and was convicted, was denied).
147 Although the district court's decision is in conformity with Burns, it made its decision attempting to follow second circuit precedent; Burns had not yet been decided.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited Burns in upholding the
correctness of the lower court's decision.
148 United States v. Padron, 938 F.2d 29, 30 (2nd Cir. 1991).
149 Id.
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guidelines, which it strikes me is not a very workable approach, they
seem to think we should do it.
I thought you should be aware of it. 150
While Burns held that a sentencing judge must announce that
she is contemplating departure from the Guidelines, the sentencing
judge in Padron did more than just contemplate departure. He
unambiguously stated that he would depart from the Guidelines if
the defendant were to testify and was found guilty. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that the
court's warning was "flawed" because the departure was conditioned on whether the defendant testified at trial. Nevertheless, the
court of appeals found the sentencing judge's comments to be "not
inappropriate," and denied the defendant's petition for rehearing. 15 ' The court of appeals, citing Burns, downplayed the sentenc15 2
ing judge's strong statement, terming it "well-intentioned."'
Supporting its decision to deny rehearing, the court mentioned as
noteworthy the fact that the defendant chose not to testify and that
there was in fact a great risk that judge and jury would have disbe153
lieved his testimony at trial.
Despite the sentencing judge's unusual zealousness, Padron
highlights some of the practical problems courts may face in trying
to conform with Burns. In Padron, the court referred at trial to the
possibility of a future "aggravating circumstance," 15 4 the defendant's potential testimony at trial. Even if the court had more cautiously stated that it would merely contemplate the possibility of
departure if the defendant were to testify, that statement at trial
could create a partisan climate that "chills" the defense's efforts, the
court's admonitions to the contrary notwithstanding. 15 5
The sentencing court in Padron made a good faith attempt to
warn the parties of a possible departure. By obligating the sentencing judge to state that she is contemplating a departure, Burns opens
the door for future, potentially wasteful petitions for rehearing such
as that in Padron. By attempting to follow the holding in Burns,
judges may cause future defendants to claim that their options for
presenting a defense have been unfairly limited, and use that perceived unfairness as a basis for appeal.
150 Id.

151 Id. The court in Padron concluded that, "Padron surely cannot complain of imprecision in the wording ofJudge Goettel's warning in the absence of any objection when
the caution was given." Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.

155 Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Court's opinion in Burns is troubling both for its result and
its reasoning. The district court judge listened to arguments made
at Burns's sentencing hearing and then exercised her discretionary
power to depart upward from the Guidelines, stating three reasons
why she believed the departure to be necessary. Under Burns future
judges must explicitly state what the Federal Sentencing Act makes
clear by itself: that judges may use their discretionary power to depart from the range suggested by the Guidelines. The Court's requirement in Burns is not only unnecessary, it is also incompatible
with principles of judicial neutrality, forcing a judge to reveal her
sentencing inclination prematurely. Further, the reasoning in the
decision permits the Court to second-guess Congress, creating procedural requirements where Congress did not specify them. Finally,
the absence of notice does not infringe on the defendant's right to
due process. The Court in Burns therefore incorrectly required sentencing judges to provide notice that they are contemplating departure and the grounds on which they intend to depart.
THOMAS GILSON

